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AB STR A C T
Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem states that the social welfare function is the 
weighted sum of individuals’ utility functions if: (i) society maximizes expected 
social welfare; (ii) individuals maximize expected utility; (iii) society is indifferent 
between two probability distributions over social states whenever all individuals 
are. After giving a simpler proof, an alternative axiomatic foundation for Vickrey- 
Harsanyi utilitarianism is provided. The problem of treating societies with incom­





















































































































































































Harsanyi’s Utilitarian T heorem
1. Introduction
Gabriel Cramer (1728) and then Daniel Bernouilli (1738, 1954) first proposed 
as a decision criterion the maximization of expected utility rather than of expected 
wealth. Much later, in an appendix to their classic work, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1943) set out for the first time an axiomatic justification for this 
criterion. They were also the first to appreciate fully how their theory provided 
a cardinal concept of utility — i.e., one that is unique up to linear (or affine) 
transformations of the utility function. This was in contrast to the ordinal concept 
of utility which is unique up to general increasing transformations.
Very shortly thereafter, Lerner (1944) showed that expected social welfare 
could be maximized, under certain symmetry conditions, by equalizing income — 
see Sen (1969, 1973) for futher discussion of this result. Perhaps more important, 
however, was Vickrey’s (1945) realization that this von Neumann-Morgenstern 
cardinalization could be used to measure marginal utility in a way that relates to 
statements about what redistributions of income would be desirable. Of course, for 
any one individual’s cardinal utility function, it is true that measures of that indi­
vidual’s marginal utility for different levels of income are all uniquely determined 
up to a single multiplicative constant. This use of the cardinal utility function was 
contested by Friedman and Savage (1952), which led in turn to Harsanyi’s (1953) 
comment on their paper. It was in this comment that Harsanyi first enunciated 
his idea of “impersonality,” according to which ethical decisions should be based 
upon the interests of persons who have had all personal biases removed by being 
put in a situation of complete uncertainty about their true identity.
Also in the early 1950’s, a paper by Fleming (1952) appeared which advocated 
that the social welfare function should be additively separable over individuals, 
over time periods, and also over uncertain states of the world. This prompted 




























































































In part, Harsanyi adapted Lerner’s idea significantly and considered, several years 
before Rawls (1959, 1971), an “original position” in which an individual is sup­
posed to choose the social state without knowing which member of the society he 
will become upon emerging from behind what Rawls so aptly called the “veil of 
ignorance.” Unlike Rawls, however, Harsanyi has always stuck to the orthodox 
theory of choice under uncertainty — namely, the existence of subjective proba­
bilities, and then the maximization of expected utility. Of course, in the original 
position, symmetry was postulated, so that there was an equal probability of be­
coming each individual in the society. Later, Harsanyi (1975a, 1975b) emphasized 
this crucial difference from what Rawls called the “difference principle.” These 
articles by Harsanyi appeared after Rawls’ theory had acquired its great popular­
ity — which it fully deserved, though mostly for reasons having little to do with 
the difference principle per se. Indeed, the version of Harsanyi (1975a) which is 
reprinted in Harsanyi (1976) contains an additional section responding to Rawls’ 
(1974) more thorough discussion of his reasons for using the difference principle 
rather than an expected social welfare criterion.
A key step in Harsanyi’s (1955) argument was the claim that expected social 
welfare would be the weighted sum of expected individual utility functions, as­
suming that whenever all individuals are indifferent between any two probability 
distributions over social states, then so is society. Strictly speaking, Harsanyi’s 
justification for this claim relied on some implicit assumptions concerning possible 
variations in individuals’ expected utility levels — assumptions similar to those 
which were also made in Hammond (1983). This was first pointed out by Domator 
(1979), it seems, who, along with a number of other authors more recently, have 
given rigorous proofs without such additional assumptions — see especially Bor­
der (1985), Coulhon and Mongin (1989), and also Broome (1990). Section 2 below 
will present what I believe to be an equally rigorous, but rather simple proof. For 
the case of a finite number of social states, this proof uses an elementary result 
in linear algebra which can be found, for instance, in Gale (1960). The idea of 




























































































precursor to Border (1985). For the general case of an infinite number of social 
states, the proof relies only on the finite intersection property of compact sets.
For too long a time Harsanyi’s approach was not very widely appreciated, 
and even today remains controversial. Fleming (1957), Diamond (1967), and Pat- 
tanaik (1968) made relatively early criticisms. Diamond’s criticism, which Sen 
(1970) also expressed, and to which Harsanyi (1975b) contains a response, was 
that maximizing expected social welfare could produce unacceptable inequalities 
of utility. Yet it is not clear what these inequalities really signify until we give 
“utility” some concrete meaning; once we do, the criticism essentially loses its 
force, as Broome (1989) in particular has pointed out.
Pattanaik’s concern was more with Harsanyi’s original position argument, 
and the claim that a better understanding of individual psychology was likely to 
bring us closer to a social welfare function that all could agree to. In fact, despite 
Harsanyi’s serious attempts to argue otherwise, it seems all too likely that different 
individuals, even with a perfect understanding of psychology, and even behind 
Em apparently common veil of ignorance, would still retain their different views 
about what other individuals’ attitudes to risk are likely to be, and about how 
to weight the von Neumann-Morgenstem utility functions of different individuals 
which represent these attitudes to risk. Oddly enough, a similar debate surrounds 
the assumption of HarsEmyi (1967-8) and Aumann (1987) regarding the existence 
of common prior beliefs in game theory.
Given these and other problems with original position arguments, Section 3 
suggests a procedure for side-stepping the issue entirely. The argument is actually 
no more than a summary of ideas discussed more extensively in Hammond (1987). 
Indeed, those ideas build on or relate to Hammond (1983, 1986, 1988a, b, c) and the 
realization that a new “consequentialist” framework, based on analysing behaviour 
in decision trees, could Edso help to justify the axioms behind conventional expected 
utility theory. This is really the reason why I find Harsanyi’s fundamental work 




























































































Finally, Section 4 discusses a natural extension of the previous formulation to 
societies in which there is incomplete information about individuals’ true utilities 
and other features relevant to a proper ethical decision. Adapting Harsanyi’s 
(1967-8) key insight regarding games of incomplete information, it becomes clear 
that one needs to consider not just social states in the usual sense, but contingent 
social states which depend on different individuals’ types. These are closely related 
to the “game forms” which Sugden (1985, 1986) has argued, in opposition to Sen, 
are the right way of modelling individual rights — see also Gaertner, Pattanaik 
and Suzumura (1988) and Riley (1989, 1990).
2. Proof o f Harsanyi’s Theorem
Let X  be the space of social states, which is assumed to be a (Borel) mea­
surable set with n-algebra X . Let M (X )  be the set of probability measures on 
X , and let M o (X )  be the set of simple probability measures on X  —  i.e., those 
for which there is a finite support X  C X  with p (X )  =  1. Suppose that each 
individual i in the membership M  (a finite set) has a welfare ordering fc; on 
M (X )  represented by the expected value E,,!;j(x) with respect to g 6 M {X )  of 
the von Neumann-Morgenstem utility function (NMUF) Vi : X  —> 9L Suppose too 
that there is a social ordering fc on M (X )  which is represented by the expected 
value E^uj(x ) of a “von Neumann-Morgenstern Bergson social welfare function” 
w : X  —> 5 ft .  Finally, suppose that Pareto indifference is satisfied —  i.e., that
[Vi e  M  : m ~i =*• n ~  v,
or equivalently, that
[Vi £ M  : E ,,^  =  E„Vj] =4- E f,w =  E,/U>
for all pairs fi,is £ X l(X ). Then Harsanyi’s theorem is the implication that there 
exist welfare weights uq (i 6 M ) and an additive constant a such that





























































































on X . This theorem was proved by Harsanyi (1955). As pointed out in the 
introduction, however, there were a number of unnecessary implicit assumptions 
concerning how possible variations in the social state x could lead to entirely 
independent variations in the value of each individual’s utility Vi(x).
The following proof considers first the case when X  =  A, a finite set consisting 
of ffA  members. Then the argument uses ideas similar to those in Border (1981). 
The (new) proof for a general measurable space (X , X )  follows later.
Proof (when X  =  A, a finite set).
Let 17(1 ) (x G A) be any set of # A  real numbers satisfying
^ , x e A rl(,x)vi(x ) =  0 (all 1 € M)\ ^ 2 xeA ri(x) =  °- (2)
For all 1 G A, define
p (r ) :=  (1 /# A ) + A r7( i ) ;  v(x) :=  (1 /# A )  -  A r/(x) (3)
where A >  0 is small enough to ensure that p(x), i/(x) >  0 for all x G A. Then 
p, v G M  (A) and also
p(x) — i/(x) =  2A 77(1) (all x G .4). (4)
It follows that
Vi(x) -  E „ Vi(x) =  ^ i6/4 [p(x) -  v(x)) Ui(x) =  2A Y ^ z(iA r](x) u,(x) =  0 (5)
for every i G M . So, by the assumption of Pareto indifference,
0 =  E „ w(x) -  E „ w(x) =  J 2 ieA lp(x) -  v(x)]w(x) =  2A ^ xeA l ( x )w(x )- (6)
Thus any #  A-vector 77(1) (x G A) satisfying (2) above also satisfies
*?(*)«»(*) = °. (7)
Consider now any row vector 77 with elements tj(x) (x G A). Suppose that 77 




























































































4fM  columns are u,(x) (x £ A, i £ A/) and whose elements in the last column are 
all ones. Then 17 satisfies (2) above, and so we have just shown that it must also 
satisfy (7). From the Solvability Theorem due to Gale (1960, p. 41), it follows that 
the column vector w whose components io(x) (x £ A ) is spanned by the columns 
of this # A  x +  1) matrix. So there must exist constants uq (i £ M ) and a
for which
w(x) =  a +  ^  ^  Vi(x) (all x £ A) (1')
as required. |
The above result can now be used to prove Harsanyi’s theorem for a general 
(possibly infinite) measurable set X  as follows.
Proof (when X  is an infinite set).
First, reduce M  if necessary to a set M* with the linear independence property 
that the only solution to the equation
0 =  a +  ^ 2  eM. Ui Uj(x) (all x £ X )  (8)
in the unknown constants a and u>; (i £ M *) is the trivial solution with a =  Wi =  0 
(all i £ M *). This is possible because, if
0 =  a  +  ^  f o>i Vj(x) (all x £ X )  (9)
has a non-trivial solution in a and (t £ M ), there must be at least one non­
zero u>j (j  £ M ). But this implies that the corresponding function vj(x) can be 
expressed as a linear combination
vj(x) =  otj +  ^ 2 ieMX[j] Cbji u,(x) (all x £ X )  (10)
of a constant term and of all the other functions n;(x) ( i ^  j ) .  If the linear 
independence property (8) is still not satisfied by M* even after it has been reduced 
to the set M \  { j } ,  then M* :=  M \  { ) }  can be reduced still further in this way as 




























































































After this reduction has been finally completed, for every j  G M  \ M* it will be 
true that the function Vj(x) can be expressed as a linear combination
Vj(x) =  a'j +  ^ 2 ieM, Vi(x) (all x G X ). (11)
Now, for any finite A C X , define the set
H(A) :=  { (X ,a ,u M' )  G S #M' +2 | A2 +  a 2 +  £ |gM< u,2 =  1
& V i G A : A w(x) =  a +  ?  vAx) }.'  j£M*
( 12)
By Harsanyi’s theorem applied to the finite case, which has just been proved, there 
certainly exist both an # M -dimensional vector u M G 11' ! and a constant a G 5R 
such that
w(x) =  a  +  5 3 jgM w.-Wi(*) (13)
for all x G A. But then (11) implies that in fact there must exist a different 
#M*-dimensional vector u>M G and a constant a G 3t such that
uj(x ) =  a  +  i€M. W tti(x) (14)
for all x G A. Now just divide each side of (14) by y l  +  a2 +  w  in order 
to ensure that the normalized coefficients lie on the surface of the unit sphere: the 
result makes it evident that the set fi(A ) is non-empty for every finite A C X . 
Next notice how, for any finite A C X , one has
n(A) = nl 6/tn({x}). (15)
As has just been shown, this must be non-empty. Now, for each x G X , the set 
f i( {x } )  is evidently compact because it is a closed subset of the surface of the unit 
sphere in +2. Therefore, by the finite intersection property for arbitrary
families of compact sets, it follows that




























































































So there exists some combination (\ ,a ,u M ) £ vf +2 for which
A wi(x ) =  a +  '52ieM. v‘ (x ) (all * 6 * ) ( 17)
and also
A2 + q 2 +  V .  „  a,2 =oeM* (18)
Now, if it were true that A =  0, then one would have
0 =  a +  u>{Vi(x) (all x £ X )  (19)
for some constants satisfying a 2 +  YLieM’ u i ~  1> which therefore cannot all be 
zero. This would contradict the construction of the reduced set M* which has to 
satisfy the linear independence property (8). So it must be true that A 5̂  0. One 
can therefore divide each side of (16) by A in order to obtain
w(x) =  at +  y *  uiiVi(x) (till x £ X )  (20)
for suitable newly defined constants a £ 3? and uiM £ , with ui; =  0 for all
i £ M  \ M *. This completes the proof.
3. Social Welfare, Personal Issues, and Individual Welfare
This section will provide an alternative motivation to that of Harsanyi’s orig­
inal position for his form of utilitarianism. Indeed, it will be claimed that his form 
of utilitiarianism is a logical implication of the standard “Bayesian” approach to 
decision-making under uncertainty, when this is combined with a plausible formal­
ization of the key idea in individualistic ethics — namely, that actions should be 
judged by whether they produce desirable consequences for individuals.
The argument will rely upon the fiction that a different personalized version 
Xi of the social state x £ X  is possible for each different individual i £ M . This 
idea is very similar to the notion of personalized public goods, as exploited by 




























































































X M :=  IligM Xi of possible •personalized social states will be considered, in which 
each component space X ; (i G M ) is a copy of the space X . Of course, the 
constraint that X{ =  x for all i G M  and for some single social state x G X  
will usually have to be observed in practice, just as all individuals are generally 
required to have the same bundle of public goods. Nevertheless, in thinking about 
society’s objectives, it will be useful to contemplate what would be possible in the 
absence of this constraint.
Ethical decisions whose consequences lie in this space of personalized social 
states are assumed to satisfy the standard Bayesian rationality postulate. Thus it 
will be assumed that:
ASSUMPTION 1. There exists some social welfare ordering fc on the space 
M ( X m) which represents the relative ethical desirabilities o f different uncertain 
social consequences. Moreover, there must be a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
social welfare function W  : X M —* S with the property that, for every pair of 
probability distributions p, v G .VI(A ^ ), one has p )z v if and only if IV > 
E „W .
So far, could be an expected welfare function representing a purely
collectivist ethic, paying no attention to individuals whatsoever. To capture the 
idea that it is only each individual’s welfare which matters, two other assumptions 
will be made. Before they can be stated, however, some additional notation is 
needed. For any given joint probability distribution p G M ( X M) over all the 
different individuals’ personalized social states x M =  (ijjigAf, and any given in­
dividual i G M , let pi G M (X i)  denote the marginal distribution marg^. p of i's 
personalized social state z,.
It will now be assumed that any stochastic dependence between the person­
alized consequences of different individuals is irrelevant to the welfare ordering, 
so that the social ordering depends only on the marginal distribution over the 




























































































ASSUMPTION 2. For all /i, v g M (X M), assume that if /!,- =  i/,- for all i E M , then 
fj ~  v.
Let pM :=  n ieM Mi denote the joint probability distribution of the vector x M 
having the property that the distributions of the different individuals’ personalized 
social states x; (i g M ) are all independent, and equal to the appropriate marginal 
distributions /i;. As an implication of Assumption 2 notice that p ~  pM for all 
/; g M ( X m). Indeed, it is sufficient always to consider the collection //., (i g A1) of 
marginal distributions, without worrying at rill about any interdependence within 
the joint distribution p of different personalized social states x; (i 6 M ).
Finally, it will also be assumed that any ethically relevant external effects 
which are of consequence to individual i have already been included within the 
personalized social state x;. In particular, it will be assumed that the ethically 
proper choice of the marginal distribution pi g M (X {)  of i’s personalized social 
state x; is completely unaffected by the joint distribution /i_; 6 of
the profile x _ ; g :=  n j 6M\{i} X j consisting of all the other individuals’
personalized social states. Formally:
ASSUMPTION 3. For each individual i g M , there exists an ordering fc;, called 
individual i ’s ethical welfare ordering, such that for every fixed distribution 
fi-i 6 A f (A M'dd ) and all pairs m,Vi 6 A t(X j), one has
pi fc, m •*=> iL (vi,p_i).
Note how each individual’s welfare ordering has essentially been derived from 
the social ordering over personal issues, rather than the social ordering being 
derived from all the different individuals’ welfare orderings. Moreover, it is not 
explicitly assumed that each individual’s welfare ordering can be represented by 
the expected value of some cardinal individual welfare function, even though this 
will turn out to be an implication of all the three assumptions together. This 
indirect approach to the definition of an individual’s welfare ordering is similar to 




























































































individual’s “ethical welfare” preferences or “interests” get properly respected in 
constructing the social ordering fc and so the individual welfare ordering fc,, then 
this is entirely consistent with what was called “ethical liberalism” in Hammond 
(1987).
Because the social welfare ordering fc on M ( X M) is represented by the ex­
pected value of the social welfare function W (x M), it follows that, for each fixed 
x _ t- £ the individual welfare ordering fc, on .M (X ,) is represented by the
expected value of W (x ;,x _ j). So, for each i £ M , there exists a unique cardinal 
equivalence class of individual welfare functions uq(x,) with the property that
Wi(xi) =  a ,(x _ i) +  /3i(x-i)W (xi, x_ j)
for all Xj £ X , and all x_j £ X M\('l, where a,(x  _ ;) is an arbitrary real-valued 
function of x_,q and /3j(x_i) is a positive real-valued function of x_j. In future 
W i(n) will be used to denote any particular member of this equivalence class.
Assumptions 2 and 3 above now imply that, for all pairs p, v £ M ( X m) satis­
fying m ~ j iq for all i £ M , it must be true that (fiJ,v M\J) ~  j/m \IA0}1)
whenever j  £ J C M . From this it follows easily by induction on the number of 
members in the set J that fx ~  v. We have therefore confirmed that
[Vi £ M  : E „wi =  E„rci] = >  E MW =  TE„W.
So, by Harsanyi’s theorem which was proved in the last section, there must exist 
welfare weights oq (i £ M ) and an additive constant a  such that
W (x M) =  a +
Indeed, for the special case being considered in this section, the device of person­
alized social states allows sufficient independent variations in different individuals’ 
utilities for Harsanyi’s (1955) original proof to be used.
Moreover, Assumption 3 in particular allows a stronger conclusion in this case. 




























































































because, for every fixed £ I l j 6JW\{i} -M (Xj) and for all pairs /<;, i', £ M (X i), 
one actually has
m  >-< ^  ==► y  (iq,/(_;)■
Otherwise, if this were not true, fc (//,-, /i—<) would imply that i/j fcj p;
because of Assumption 3. Now, however, the cardinal individual welfare functions 
Wi(xi) can be re-normalized so that they become Wi(xi) :=  u>;(X{), and the social
welfare function W (x M) can be replaced by W (x M) :=  W (x M) — a. Accordingly, 
one has
W ( x M ) =  J 2 i ç M ^ X t)-
This has therefore become a version of classical utilitarianism, but with a much 
more general interpretation of individual utility or welfare. Each individual i ’s 
function Wi(xi) represents the ethical value or “goodness” of i's personalized con­
sequence Xi. For Benthamites, goodness corresponded to pleasure minus pain. But 
much wider and less naïve interpretations of individual utility or welfare functions 
are certainly allowed. The possibilities are rich enough, in fact, to embrace almost 
any individualistic ethical theory.
Of course, all the constructions presented here rely on interpersonal compar­
isons of utility. These have been controversial among economists. Nevertheless, 
they can be interpreted as ethical preferences for different kinds of people —  an 
idea which is expounded at some length in Hammond (1991b), so I shall not repeat 
the discussion here. Nor will I repeat here the possible reformulations of Arrow’s 
independence of irrelevant alternatives condition so that it becomes consistent with 




























































































4. Societies with Incomplete Information and Personal Rights
The previous sections have considered only societies in which each individual 
i 6 M  was assumed to have a known welfare ordering. Yet real ethical decisions 
often have to be taken which affect individuals whose interests may be known only 
very imperfectly. In addition, the ethical decision maker is usually not the only 
person taking decisions. The individuals in the set M  may also be making their 
own choices. These may affect each other both directly, and also indirectly through 
their effect on what possibilities remain open to the ethical decision maker.
Such complicated interactions are, of course, the subject of game theory. It is 
as though some ethical “principal” were confronting a set of individual “agents,” 
each having their own personal objective. Moreover, it is natural to think of 
the society having to be described by a game of incomplete information, in the 
sense which Harsanyi (1967-8) was the first to set out formally. After all, both 
the agents and the ethical principal are players who are likely to be imperfectly 
informed about one another’s objectives, beliefs, etc. In addition, as I have tried 
to argue in Hammond (1991c), the (ethical) principal will not be able to make 
Bayesian rational decisons unless they are analysed within some complete game 
model of the society in which they are all living. It is then necessary as well to 
form appropriate prior beliefs about what strategies the various agents will choose 
in that model. This is entirely in accord with Bemheim (1984, 1986) and Pearce’s 
(1984) work on rationalizable strategies, as well as that of Aumann (1987) and 
others on correlated equilibrium.
A framework is needed to describe the ethical principal’s incomplete informa­
tion, including incomplete information about the incomplete information of other 
individuals, and about their incomplete information regarding the incomplete in­
formation of others, etc. Such a framework is provided by Harsanyi’s (1967-8) 
notion of the “type” of a player in the game. It is actually a far from trivial issue 
whether a big enough space of possible types to accommodate this infinite regress 




























































































at least in principle, has now been provided by, for example, Mertens and Zamir 
(1985) or Tan and Werlang (1988, pp. 373-5). They use ideas that were, however, 
pioneered earlier by Boge and his associates —  see Armbruster and Boge (1979), 
Boge and Eisele (1979), and the earlier unpublished work cited therein.
In game theory, a player’s type should include everything relevant for de­
termining that player’s: (i) payoff function; (ii) rule for selecting a particular 
strategy that maximizes expected utility, whenever there is more than one; (iii) 
beliefs about all the other players’ types. In ethics, it is also necssary to include: 
(iv) everything relevant to determining that individual’s ethical welfare ordering 
(which is generally different from the individual’s own payoff function).
A society with incomplete information can now be formulated. It will consist 
of a set of individuals whose “names” or labels lie in the finite set N. For each 
j  6 N  there is a set Tj of potential types for person j .  Each possible type tj g Tj 
of each individual j  £ N  will be regarded as a separate “contingent individual,” 
described by the pair (J,tj). The set of contingent individuals who actually exist 
is effectively random, since it is unknown to the ethical decision maker. Thus 
society must be thought of as consisting of all possible contingent individuals, 
since all have potential interests which can be affected by the ethical decision. 
The membership of the society is therefore given by the set
M ; = l U v ( 0 } * r >)
of all possible pairs (j, tj)  satisfying j  £ N  and tj 6 Tj. In the special case when 
Tj =  T  for all j  £ N, then M  can be expressed more simply as the product 
space N  x T. A serious complication, of course, is that if any of the type spaces 
Tj is infinite then the set M  will also be infinite —  even though N  itself is only 
finite. This gives rise to analytical complexities such as the need to replace sums 
by integrals and to discuss measurability issues. In order to avoid these, it will 
simply be assumed here that, as in Harsanyi’s original formulation of games of 




























































































As in Section 2, the ethical decision maker is assumed to be concerned about 
the social states or consequences in some domain X . Only now it has to be 
recognized that, even if full control over the social state really were posible, it 
might well not be ethically desirable. Instead, the social state should probably 
respond to changes in individuals’ types, because part of each individual i's type 
describes i ’s own ethical welfare ordering. Changes in this ordering should often 
give rise to changes in the social state. In economics, for example, where the social 
state is the entire allocation of resources within an economy, maintaining efficiency 
requires responding appropriately to changes in each individual’s wants and needs. 
Moreover, such changes may be inevitable because the ethical decision maker has 
limited ability to prevent individuals from choosing certain aspects of the social 
state as they please.
To represent this dependence of the social state on individuals’ types, an 
extended notion of type-contingent social state becomes necessary. First, let tN € 
T N :=  n ieiv T] denote a typical type profile, with one type for each named 
individual j  6 N. Responsiveness to types obviously requires that the social 
state x should be a function tN >-» x =  (,(tN) of the variable type profile, where 
£ : T N —> X . The space of all possible type-contingent social states is then
E := := n , „ 6T„ *(*") = { £ : T "  -* X },
where X (tN) denotes the set of social states that can occur when the type profile is 
tN. Such type-contingent social states are effectively the same as the “game forms” 
used by Sugden (1985, 1986) and others in their discussion of rights. Individuals’ 
types are equivalent to strategies in such a game form, and the outcome of the 
game is what I am calling a social state.
All the previous arguments of Harsanyi and of this paper could now be applied 
to the society with membership M  and space of type-contingent social states E. 
They suggest that an appropriate ethical objective is the maximization of the 
expected value of some cardinal social welfare function having the additive form 




























































































Now, however, there is much more structure. Really, the only reason why the 
ethical decision maker needs to consider all different possible type profiles tN £ T N 
is because of uncertainty about which is the right one. Along with Harsanyi, I 
continue to impose full Bayesian rationality, and so claim that this uncertainty 
should be described by some subjective probability distribution n(tN) (tN £ T N). 
Then the ethical decision maker should be maximizing the expected value with 
respect to x of some welfare function W (x',tN) which would be the appropriate 
one if the type profile were known to be tN. Moreover, the previous arguments 
can be used yet again to claim that, for each tN 6 T N, the social welfare function 
W (x ;tN) should have the additive form W (x ;tN) =  YljeN wj(x i^j) f° r suitable 
type-dependent cardinal individual welfare functions W j(-;tj) (j £ N; tj £ Tj). 
Note how it is being assumed that j ’s welfare function W j(-;tj) depends only on 
j ’s own type tj; this is natural on the understanding that all kinds of external 
effects should be included within the definition of any social state or consequence 
x £ X .
When the type-contingent social state is £ : T "  —* X , putting these different 
functions W (x ;tN) together gives
no = E«*6r*
as the appropriate measure of expected social welfare, after allowing for uncertainty 
about the type profile tN £ T N. Generally this uncertainty forces the ethical 
decision maker to trade off decisions leading to good consequences for different 
type profiles, and to do so in a way that is sensitive to the subjective probability 
assessments n(tN) (tN £ X'v ). Only by discovering the true type profile can this 
uncertainty be avoided. There are, however, serious obstacles in the way of doing 
so; this is the final topic to be discussed in this paper.
Indeed, the question of how to elicit private information has been the topic 
of much work since the early 1970’s. There is no space here to discuss properly 
what has become an enormous literature. Nor is there any need, since the basic 




























































































state adapt to changes in individuals’ private information, it is necessary that the 
right incentives be created. I have already suggested that one can usefully think 
of a society as composed of individuals who interact within some enormously 
complicated game of incomplete information —  see also Hammond (1990). The 
issue becomes one of how the ethical decision maker should behave in such a game. 
The ethical objectives have already been discussed. They are the topic of social 
choice theory, and all the previous part of this paper has been devoted to giving 
reasons why the most suitable objective is likely to be some version of Harsanyi’s 
form of utilitarianism. The need to provide incentives, however, arises because the 
ethical decision maker does not have full control over the process which determines 
the social state —  other individuals’ actions are also important, and will usually 
be much more so. Thus incentives are concerned with constraints on what the 
ethical decision maker can achieve, rather than with desirable social objectives. 
For this reason, they really lie beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, it is already possible to see that the issue of individual rights 
arises much more naturally when society is modelled as having incomplete infor­
mation. Dasgupta (1982) was probably the first to point this out with any kind 
of formal argument. An increased respect for rights also emerges if we take into 
account the limited control that the ethical decision maker has over individual ac­
tions which affect the social state. Both incomplete information and moral hazard 
give individuals powers to affect their own destinies in ways which would meet 
with the approval of libertarians. An ethical decision maker can only control in­
dividuals’ actions if some enforcement mechanism is in place. Most of the time, 
such enforcement mechanisms are inevitably both intrusive and costly in other 
ways. Then, however, a proper ethical utilitarian calculation of the costs and 
benefits of having an enforcement mechanism is quite likely to decide that effec­
tive enforcement is not worthwhile. The same is true of incomplete information 
about something which, if known, could improve quality of some important ethical 
decision. In order that something which is known only privately can be discov­




























































































to reveal what they alone know. These can be normal incentives, such as those 
a shop-keeper provides to encourage customers to reveal what they want to buy 
and what is an upper bound on the price which they are willing to pay. Alter­
natively, the ethical decision maker may be able to coerce the information out of 
the individual in some unpleasant way. In the latter case, however, the coercion 
itself imposes enormous costs which are very rarely going to be outweighed by 
any ethical benefits which the knowledge might yield. The point is that a full 
description of the type-contingent social state has to specify what means will be 
used to enforce certain kinds of behaviour and to encourage certain kinds of pri­
vate information to be revealed. When this is done properly, many attempts to 
infringe what people see as their rights, even if such attempts would otherwise be 
ethically valid, are likely to be evauated as ethically unacceptable when all kinds 
of enforcement cost are taken into account.
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